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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SECURITY COMMITTEE

SECOM-D-4


23 September 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Security Committee Members

SUBJECT : Request for Review
Harassment Study

Attached is a draft of the updated study on harassments and provocations.

Your concurrence in publication or your comments and recommendations are requested by 14 October 1974.



Executive Secretary

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Attachment

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Unclassified when removed from
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FOREWORD

This study documents the contention of the Security Committee that harassments and provocations of US citizens traveling in East European countries have and probably will continue, if not as an expression of official policy at least as tolerated operational procedures of the intelligence service of these countries.

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INTRODUCTION

The USIB Security Committee published in 1967 a study of provocations and harassments against US citizens assigned to or visiting East European countries. The study was prepared as an aid to member agencies in the preparation of Defensive Briefings for travelers and assignees.

With a goal of presenting information on changes in techniques or procedures of harassment and provocation which may have surfaced over the past 7 years, the Security Committee herein offers a selective compilation of incidents and events as an update of the 1967 study.

While the current study again draws its examples from East European countries, the Department of State informs that they have been carefully watching the situation in China since the reopening of the US mission in Peking. So far the Chinese have apparently refrained from any discernible activities of a ~~harassing or provocative nature.~~ They have in fact kept at some distance from American personnel. The Department of State continues to brief and debrief its personnel assigned to Peking. The Security Committee is interested in the experiences of other agencies which may reflect any noticable change in the pattern of activities concerning Chinese intelligence activities against American personnel.

The following remarks are derived from knowledge of KGB work against foreign tourists but to a varying degree the same points might apply to activities of all East European Intelligence Services (EEIS).

In the Soviet Union one element of the KGB [the Seventh Department of the Second (Counterintelligence) Chief Directorate] is responsible for control of tourists. Control over tourists has three basic purposes. One is counterespionage, to detect which tourists are agents or officers of foreign intelligence services

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and to prevent any operational activity by them. A second function is the quarantine purpose, to isolate the Soviet populace from the infectious influences of western ideas, aspirations and values. It might also be added that this purpose is to preclude Soviet dissidents from obtaining the aid of the tourist in furthering their own aim. This is done by controlling, through KGB agents, most of the contacts foreigners have in the USSR, by limiting other contacts to a minimum and by monitoring whatever such contacts do take place. The third basic control purpose is the propaganda one, to permit foreign visitors to observe only the positive and favorable elements of Soviet life and to shield negative and sordid aspects from view.

In addition to this defensive control function, the KGB has an offensive operational function, to recruit agents for its espionage nets abroad. In practice the KGB considers these two to be closely interrelated.

The definitions used for the purpose of this study are:

Harassment - Any action taken against a person or group to prevent or delay the achievement of objectives. The action may be of an inconsequential or annoying nature escalating to one of major proportions. The harassment may also be a prelude to a provocation.

Provocation - Any action taken against a person, group or intelligence service to induce self-damaging action. The provocation is frequently the prelude to a recruitment attempt or official action by the state, including arrest, imprisonment or expulsion.

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HIGHLIGHTS

There is indication of an increased use of technical devices in surveillance. There are indications of use of concealed audio recording devices by street surveillants in hopes of recording inadvertent remarks, use of briefcase cameras and, in one case, a woman's purse camera to photograph individuals of interest. Of a more serious nature is the recently discovered ability of all East European Intelligence Services to locate and fix the positions of vehicles even after apparently successful evasion techniques. All US attaches reporting on this phenomenon attribute this new found "ability" to a vehicular mounted electronic tracking or homing device. To date this device has gone undetected in spite of unannounced physical inspections of vehicles. In addition to the homing device there have been indications that cars have

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been bugged with transmitters or concealed tape recorders. The existence and use of these more sophisticated acoustical technical equipment in vehicles indicates that vehicles as well as residences, offices and hotel rooms continue to be targets for technical penetration.

By far the most frequently reported examples of provocation continue to be attempted entrapment via sexual inducements. The only significant change in modus operandi to be noted occurred in one incident when a US military attache and his spouse, as well as other diplomatically accredited personnel in an Eastern European country, were invited to a formal dinner hosted by a noted physician and his spouse at their home. The physician has long been suspected of collaboration with his intelligence service. After dinner, the physician and his wife showed what was described as a "first-class pornographic movie." The physician and his spouse mentioned to their guests their personal beliefs concerning sexual freedom and invited any one in attendance to let them know if they would be interested in participating in orgies.

Specific mention should be made of the increased incidence of provocation occurring to those who visit Hungary. While the government of Hungary has done much in the recent past to promote a new image of openness and receptiveness to tourism, there has been an increase in provocations by the Hungarian Intelligence Service. There were six incidents during CY-1973 alone in which visiting military personnel born in Hungary and whose families fled Hungary in 1956 were singled out for special attention. The approaches were direct and abrupt, devoid of any subtlety. The US service member was approached directly and asked if he would work for Hungarian intelligence. Threats against relatives still in Hungary were openly made or strongly implied. On the positive side, it has been noted that once the approach had been reported to the Embassy or Defense Attache Office there was no follow-up. Nor has any follow-up attempt been reported once the military man returned to his unit.

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The approaches by the Hungarian Intelligence Service is undoubtedly not restricted to US officials or military personnel. The Department of State reported an approach to an American engineer, employed by a NASA contractor, who visited his two sons, American citizens attending medical school in Budapest, in the summer of 1973.

A situation reported by the Air Force should be mentioned as a final highlight. Within the recent past, several USAF members planning travel to East European countries have reported attempts by tourist agencies to falsify the members military status. Since declared US military personnel might be denied entrance to the country involved, this may be simply the tourist agency's way of circumventing the possibility and retaining the business. However, it results in placing US service personnel into an East European country under a false vocation, a situation which may be considered illegal by the country visited. This is an easily avoided offense which otherwise could gratuitously open a visitor to detention, arrest and prosecution. Although this issue does not fall within the strict parameters of this study, it could result in serious jeopardy for personnel. Accordingly, it is offered for what value it may be to briefers.

PROVOCATION AND HARASSMENT

For some time there was a clear campaign of vandalism, crude surveillance, physical abuse and other forms of harassment carried out against American personnel and property in Moscow in almost direct proportion to the frequency and nature of Jewish Defense League (JDL) activities against Soviet personnel in New York and Washington. Fortunately, such activities by JDL and Soviet members have almost ceased. The details of these harassments will not be included.

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Examples

1. In November 1969 the Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM), American Embassy, Moscow, was summoned to the Foreign Ministry and informed that the Soviets would permit no more Embassy support flights to fly to Moscow. This action seriously affects the Embassy's program of bringing bulk classified items into the Soviet Union.
2. During the latter part of 1967, the Soviet Embassy, Helsinki, began interrogating at length Finnish Nationals who applied for Soviet visas to travel to Moscow to assume positions as domestics with US diplomatic families. This harassment continued for several months and finally culminated in the Soviets' refusal to issue visas for Finnish Nationals to travel to the Soviet Union for the purpose of working for American diplomats. This precipitant action on the part of the Soviet Government severely restricted the mobility of Embassy officials since the Finnish maids are the principal source of supply for babysitters.
3. A Staff secretary and a female Foreign Service Officer assigned to an Eastern European post traveled for pleasure to the capital city of an adjoining Eastern European country with the approval of both posts concerned. While returning to their post of residence, they were detained at the border for a considerable period of time and required to submit to questioning and physical search despite the fact that the FSO presented her diplomatic passport. When searched, they were forced to disrobe in the presence of a female official of the border station. Found in their handbags was a small amount of currency from the country of their assignment that had not been declared upon entering the country visited. Also of apparent interest to border authorities was a tourist map of the capital that they had just visited on which the secretaries had jotted down directional notes. Several minutes of questioning regarding the possible intelligence value of the map ensued and requests by the secretaries to be allowed to contact the American Embassy were refused.

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Eventually the map and currency were confiscated, and the ladies were ordered to sign a statement in the local language presumably reflecting that they had turned over the map and currency voluntarily to the border station authorities. It soon became evident that their release was to be contingent on the signing of the statement and since they were refused communication with American officials, they relented and affixed their signatures. Frightened and confused, the ladies were then allowed to continue their journey to the home post. A formal protest through diplomatic channels ensued with little, if any, satisfaction received.

4. In August 1967 a US Embassy officer assigned to an Eastern European country was approached by a Foreign Service local employee and asked if he desired to sell his automobile. The American officer had intended to ship his vehicle to his next post, but indicated to the local employee that he would sell the automobile.

The local employee indicated a "school friend" of his desired to purchase the automobile. Several attempts to have the local employee bring his friend to the Embassy failed and the US Embassy officer finally agreed to meet the prospective buyer at his (buyer's) apartment. A sale price was agreed upon almost immediately; but the buyer did not want to comply with prescribed sales laws of the country. When the Embassy officer refused to circumvent the tax and sales laws of the country, he was advised that he had been dealing with the Security Police and his actions were illegal. Two additional security personnel were interjected into the conference and the US official was also accused of unauthorized disclosure of classified information, unspecified irregularities, and they threatened to have him declared persona non grata. The Embassy officer was refused permission to leave the apartment or get in touch with the Embassy.

When finally released, the Embassy officer reported the incident to the Deputy Chief of Mission and a protest was lodged against the host government.

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5. In January 1968 a Foreign Service employee assigned to an Eastern European country was approached in an airport waiting room by two men who said they wished to discuss a "business deal." The man talked with the Foreign Service employee for approximately twenty minutes and told him they were aware of his family problems, of official reports concerning him, and they alleged they had an agent in the Embassy who "gives them everything." The man stated they could offer the employee money, security, and good life in their country, or he could leave the country if he chose in return for cooperation.

The two men suggested the employee meet them for further talks because they could not talk well in the airport. The employee was not physically manhandled but was restrained by close bodily contact.

An unofficial protest was lodged with the host government Foreign Ministry.

6. In April 1969 at the apartment of a Soviet acquaintance, a US Foreign Service Officer (FSO) assigned to Moscow was shown a document which was to be the basis for an article which the Soviet had been instructed to write about the FSO. The document noted the officer's previous postings in South and Latin American countries, charged him with assisting in a South American country revolution, charged him with being a CIA agent, charged him with spreading anti-Soviet ideas among Latin diplomats and Soviet citizens in Moscow, and finally charged him with immoral conduct. The Soviet produced photographs showing the FSO engaging in sexual intercourse with a Soviet woman and urged the FSO to talk with "them" about the entire matter in order to quash the article and save his career. He also unsuccessfully attempted to have the FSO note on an Embassy telephone listing the "real" responsibilities of Embassy officers. The FSO managed to put off the Soviet with a promise to think it over and immediately reported the entire matter to appropriate US Embassy officials. The sexual compromise, obviously under KGB control, had occurred some

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months previously while the officer was escorting a visiting delegation in the hinterlands. It had been a classic development beginning with persistent approaches by an attractive female Soviet traveling companion, "coincidental" re-contact in the hotel, dinner, drinks, bed. Nine months later the produce of this union made its appearance in the aforementioned recruitment pitch.

7. The wife of a young Embassy officer in an Eastern European country enrolled in classes at a local art institute with the approval of her spouse and Embassy officials. She was soon befriended by two indigenous male students of the institute who took her "under their wings" to familiarize her with the capital city. Rumors soon developed among the diplomatic community that an intimate relationship had developed between the American distaff and her new-found friends. It further became known that her sister who had been visiting from the United States had become pregnant by one of the male associates.

Steps to transfer the officer and his wife out of Eastern Europe for their personal protection and well-being were initiated; however, in the interim his wife was instrumental in unlawfully exfiltrating the other male student to a Western European country. Apparently forsaking her husband and small child for the indigenous male, she had him transported in the trunk of her vehicle through border stations of two Eastern European countries into the West.

The Eastern European male involved was interviewed by appropriate authorities once he had requested refugee status in the Western European country. After questioning, he admitted being under the control of his country's intelligence service since the inception of his association with the Embassy officer and his wife. He stated that he was required, under threat, to provide detailed assessment and personal information on both Americans and instructed to become as friendly as possible with the officer's wife. He also related that his intelligence handler had requested that he place a listening device in the Embassy proper, but he denied carrying out this request. A subsequent technical

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inspection of the Embassy proved negative. He stated that he had persuaded the officer's wife to exfiltrate him from his country by relating to her the facts of his involuntary cooperation with the intelligence service and the threat of bodily harm or imprisonment if he failed to provide an adequate service. An interesting footnote developed when shortly after the officer's wife departed the country, the officer began to receive unusually frequent requests for social meetings from an attractive indigenous female with whom he had had limited previous professional contact. In light of his wife's absence from post, the officer wisely avoided any meetings.

When details of his wife's activities became known, the officer was transferred from his Eastern European assignment immediately and returned to the United States.

8. In September 1973 a married American Embassy officer, while on escort duty with a US delegation in Tbilisi, engaged in sexual relations with a Soviet female. The story developed as follows:

The officer, while in Tbilisi, was invited to dinner by a Soviet who was a member of the Russian delegation accompanying the US group. After extending the invitation, the Soviet informed the officer that he had just met a neighbor of his and asked the American if the female neighbor could join them for dinner. After arriving at the restaurant, the female friend announced that she had a girlfriend at the hotel and asked if her friend could join them. As the evening progressed, several bottles of wine and champagne were consumed and the party continued drinking in the bar after dinner. They then moved to one girl's room and after more drinking and dancing the four agreed to pair off and go to bed.

Upon returning to Moscow, the officer informed his wife and appropriate Embassy officials of his indiscretion. There was no attempt to exploit the officer's indiscreet activity but the operation appeared to be KGB inspired.

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9. In October 1972 a Finnish governess of a Foreign Service Officer assigned to the American Embassy, Moscow, was recruited by the KGB based on photographs of sexual activity between her and her Soviet fiance. KGB requirements were for the governess to furnish information on a periodic basis on the activities of her employer.

10. During late September 1972 a group of US students were traveling in the Soviet Union. One student was charged by Soviet authorities with engaging in an act of homosexuality. He was turned over to the KGB which, using the threat of imprisonment for violation of Soviet criminal statutes, attempted to recruit him into the Soviet Intelligence Service.

11. In August 1972 information was developed that a Foreign Service Officer's wife, during the period September 1971 to July 1972, was having intermittent extra-marital relations in Warsaw with a Polish tennis instructor. In July 1972, while meeting clandestinely with the Polish National, she permitted him to bring a Polish Intelligence Officer to their room. Allegedly this meeting which lasted three hours was arranged so that the FSO's wife could convince the UB officer that she was not an active intelligence agent in the employ of the American Embassy, Warsaw. The wife claimed she convinced the UB officer she was not an agent and the meeting terminated with her agreeing to sign at a later date a statement to that effect. Upon returning home, the wife reported her extra-marital relations and her meeting with the UB agent both to her husband and to the Embassy Security Officer. The couple was immediately transferred.

Generally speaking, the discernible changes noted by attaches in surveillance techniques practiced by the EEIS emanate from their increased use of technology as an aid in surveillance. Additionally, a slight modification of a heretofore inviolable dogma of not permitting attaches to enter "temporary" closed areas has been discerned. Thus, US military attaches have increasingly reported being able to enter "temporary" closed areas, only to find themselves being photographed by their EEIS surveillants with the

military installation or other points of interest in the background. Usually at these times, the surveillance vehicles close on the attache's car so as to convoy the vehicle from the area and preclude any serious attempt by the attaches to photograph or obtain much useful information. Although the effect is the same, (denial of information), the fact that attache vehicles are no longer automatically stopped and attaches detained every time they seek to enter these areas is of note. To be sure, such action still occurs but apparently with less frequency, and is dependent upon many variables. Similarly, US attaches have increasingly reported during the in-town portions of trips use of technical devices. Attaches report surveillants equipped with briefcase cameras; and in at least one instance, a woman's purse camera was utilized in attempts to photograph attaches during the in-town or walking portions of trips.

Increased EEIS utilization of technology as an aid in surveillance of US military attaches has not been limited to photographic means. Of course, acoustical surveillance of US military attaches is a time-honored tradition of the EEIS. Attache residences and offices in Eastern Europe continue to be targets for technical penetration as evidenced by the discovery of a transmitter in the office of the US Defense Attache in Budapest in 1971. Some new wrinkles in acoustical surveillance practiced by the EEIS have been discerned, however, and bear mention. Some attaches have reported that in-town EEIS surveillants are sometimes equipped with audio recording devices which they "cleverly" conceal in coat pockets, purses, and briefcases in hopes of catching an inadvertent admission by US military attaches as to their true purposes and intentions. The mind can only boggle at the substances of the "attache tapes." Of a more serious nature, however, is the recently discerned and uncanny ability of all EEIS surveillants to locate and fix the positions of attache vehicles even after attaches have concluded apparently successful evasion techniques. All US attaches reporting on this phenomenon attribute this new-found "ability" of the EEIS to a vehicular-mounted "electronic tracking or homing device." To date, however, this "device" has gone undetected in spite of unannounced physical inspections of DAO vehicles.

Further evidence of EEIS efforts to "get in the car with the attache" have also come to light. In one instance two microphones hidden in the headliner above the sun visor in an attache vehicle were discovered. The microphones were connected to wires which ran through the headliner into a hidden recess in the trunk of the vehicle. Although no tape recorder was found, it is suspected that the wires were attached to one and the tapes changed on a regular basis by local national employees. In another instance in December 1973 a US citizen was set upon in his hotel room in Moscow and accused of having a highly communicable disease not 15 minutes after he was dropped off at the hotel by a US military attache vehicle. It was interesting to note that on the trip from the airport to the hotel in the same vehicle he had discussed his recent loss of weight and generally ill feelings and jokingly stated that he had probably contracted cholera. A physical search of the vehicle disclosed no transmitters; however, it should be noted that the DAO local employees had access to the vehicle prior to the physical search conducted. In sum, EEIS acoustical surveillance efforts directed against US military attaches continue unabated. Recent reporting indicates the existence of more sophisticated EEIS technical equipment and, in addition to the time-honored objectives of home and office acoustical surveillance, attache vehicles have now been placed on the high priority targeting list.

As in harassment, the basic principles or provocations against US military attaches in Eastern Europe, as practiced by the various Eastern European Intelligence Services (EEIS), have not changed dramatically in recent years. Just as attaches in Eastern Europe continue to be subjected to constant harassment, they also continue to be the objects of provocation attempts practiced by the EEIS. By far, the most frequent examples of EEIS provocation continue to be attempted entrapment via sexual inducements of one form or another, together with other traditional ploys to include involvements in illegal currency transactions or other quasi-legal matters. One infrequent yet most potentially dangerous provocation noted has been EEIS-directed indigenous volunteers who "volunteer" to US military attaches their services as espionage agents or

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providers of hard-to-get information. This last is fraught with the most serious consequences for US interests in that US military attaches who are constantly pushed to collect information, and who are not by trade professional intelligence officers, can sometimes fail to perceive the subtle difference between a bona fide good luck find and an induced double. The result could be seriously damaging to US intelligence, not to mention to the attache, who could at best be made to leave the country or at worst double himself (wittingly or unwittingly) by the service he is seeking to penetrate.

As previously mentioned, the EEIS continue to use other traditional ploys, such as attempts to involve US military attaches in illegal currency transactions as well as other quasi-legal activities, in their attempts to place US military attaches in exploitable situations. These incidents vary from the obvious, e.g., the attache is approached on the street and asked if he would like to change US dollars for local currency, to a more careful and controlled type of provocation which develops over a long period of time and involves usually a host country counterpart to the US attache. One recent incident is indicative of this latter type of controlled and long-term approach. In this instance a US military attache in an Eastern European nation had been attempting to socially cultivate a high ranking host country military officer. For over a year this effort could at least be described as cordial but unfruitful. Quite suddenly the relationship changed in that the host country military officer began inviting the US military attache to intimate luncheons and dinners in town and at his home, as well as to his weekend retreat in the mountains. During these excursions the host country military officer hinted that he could provide sensitive information which would be of interest to the US military attache, although he made no actual offer. However, he did provide the US military attache with gifts of increasing value. Usually accompanying these gifts or offers of same were requests. These included requests for the US military attache to change local currency, which the host country military officer would provide, into US or other "hard" currency, as well as requests for the US attache to import into the country, via diplomatic pouch or Embassy support flights, items which could be obtained from the Western European PX system for the host country military attache to either keep or resell at a profit on the local economy.

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12. Two USAF dependent women traveling through an East European country as tourists returned from an evening concert to the hotel lounge where they were befriended by two local men. An exchange of drinks and dancing took place when unexpectedly one of the local men quickly departed, accompanied by three other men. One of the American girls later visited the restroom and upon departure was taken to a large room and questioned by two men about her association with local citizens. She was asked for her passport, the reason for her visit to the country, and other personal data. Repeatedly she was questioned about her knowledge of the two local men she had met in the lounge. The questioning officials appeared to doubt her several recounts of the evening's activities. An American tour friend entered the room and challenged the local officials for detaining the girl; at this point the girl was allowed to depart and subsequently returned to her hotel room where she was warned by a local maid that she was being "watched." She departed the country without further involvement or impediment by officials.

13. An American military member traveled to an East European country as a tour group member and was singled out by customs personnel at the incoming border and delayed 15 minutes while officials surveyed his "official" passport. During this tour, several American women were telephoned at different times by local men asking for social engagements. In private, an American girl asked tour members how to dispose of extra local currency; she placed the small amount in her brassiere. Exiting the country, she was singled out for a complete strip-search by custom officials.

14. An American traveling through an East European country curiously opened desks and closets in a local hotel room and subsequently found what appeared to be a covert listening device placed inside a false wall vent. Several members of this tour claimed their locked luggage had been opened and left unlocked. One member's camera was stolen from hotel luggage and later returned with the film cassette damaged. Although all American tour members experienced close scrutiny by local officials during their travels, no personal confrontations were made during the trip.

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15. Within the last year, several USAF members planning travel to Eastern European countries have reported attempts by tourist agencies to falsify the member's military status, thus circumventing denial of travel by the Eastern European country involved. This technique, if utilized successfully by the tour agency, projects a military member into a East European country under an assumed vocation, thus subjecting the American to possible prosecution by communist authorities. Although vocation falsification is not technically harassment, the implications clearly could jeopardize a military member's status while visiting an Eastern European country.

16. An American professor and his wife had spent the 1968 academic year studying at the University of Moscow. The professor returned to the University for further study during the period of April-June 1972. His wife also accompanied him on this trip. The couple had a family quarrel in the early part of June and the professor went to Leningrad where he remained for ten days at the October Hotel.

While having dinner one evening at the hotel dining room, the professor became acquainted with a Soviet. Visiting the Soviet's home, the latter advised the professor that although he was married, he also had a mistress. He offered to get a woman for the professor; which offer was refused. On the day of the professor's departure from Leningrad, the Soviet offered him photographs of various Soviet ships taken at the naval shipyard in Leningrad; which he refused. He also refused the Soviet's request to be paid in dollars for books the Soviet had bought for the professor. Prior to leaving, the two men exchanged gifts and, at the insistence of the Soviet, the professor sold him a small transistor radio for 25 rubles.

Several days prior to his departure from the Soviet Union, the professor went to the University of Moscow to retrieve his notes and papers. There he was contacted by another Soviet who advised him that he was aware of his contacts with the Soviet in Leningrad, whom he described as an ex-convict, a speculator and enemy of the people, in whom the police were interested. The professor agreed to meet this Soviet again the next day in a room at the Moscow

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Hotel at which time the Soviet reviewed the professor's contacts with the Soviet in Leningrad. The Soviet advised the professor that the sale of the transistor radio was a criminal offense, however, the professor need have no fear because he, the Soviet, was only interested in getting evidence against the other Soviet in Leningrad. The professor agreed to meet the Soviet again on the day before his scheduled departure. Upon leaving his hotel that morning, the professor observed that he was under surveillance. He, therefore, took a taxicab to the American Embassy where he reported the entire matter. He had no further contact with the Soviet prior to his departure from the USSR.

The professor believed the incident to have been an attempt by the Soviet intelligence to "use or compromise" him. He was of the opinion that his hotel TV set had been bugged, based on the fact that his wife had found a "TV repairman" working on the set when she unexpectedly returned to their hotel room one afternoon. The professor related two other incidents (of which at the time he was only casually suspicious) which occurred after his arrival at Leningrad. The first involved a male Soviet who insisted on sharing a bottle of cognac with him, while seated at the same table at the hotel dining room. The Soviet became loud and boisterous. The professor left and went into the lobby. There he was accosted by an attractive female who apologized for the Soviet's behavior, introduced herself as a tourist guide, and invited him to meet her later at a bar. The professor did not meet the girl. He commented that the Soviets apparently attached too much significance to a minor quarrel he had had with his spouse, thereby believing that he would be susceptible to entrapment.

17. An American manufacturer of integrated printed circuitry has made, through the years, many business trips to the Soviet Union. During the course of his more recent trips in 1972, he noticed that the Soviets were asking for information on parts which they knew were on the US Department of Commerce restricted list.

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On one occasion, the American and two business associates were dining in a Soviet restaurant in Moscow. Two women approached them, struck up a conversation and invited them to an apartment, indicating they would get a third woman to join them. One of the women was 19 years old and spoke perfect English. During the course of the conversation with this woman, the American determined that she "lived by her wits"; getting liquor for the party would be no problem for her, in spite of the fact that it was some two hours after the close of the State-controlled liquor stores, and any money which the men would pay to the woman for anything would have to be paid in US dollars and not in Russian currency. The men rejected the offer to accompany the woman.

The American later was contacted by the English-speaking woman, who said she wanted to meet him alone. This was arranged, and she indicated she wanted to escape from the Soviet Union and go to West Germany. She asked for the American's assistance, which was refused.

~~The American believed that these incidents were attempts to place him in a situation which might produce a compromising effect on him.~~

18. A naturalized American woman of Russian descent traveled to the USSR in 1972 to visit relatives. In Moscow, she was met by her brother and his wife, and then proceeded with them by plane for another city in the USSR where the couple resided.

Upon arrival in this city late in the afternoon, the American was taken by her sister-in-law to the Soviet Militia Office to register. Since it was late, the American was told to return the following day. When she returned, a female receptionist, believed to be a representative of INTOURIST, questioned her briefly and asked her to complete a questionnaire containing many questions about her brothers and sister living in the Soviet Union. The American explained to the receptionist that she was unable to complete the questionnaire because she had very little information concerning

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her relatives. A week later, the American was requested again to report to the INTOURIST Office to pick up her passport. Upon arriving at the office, she was told to return in two days because her papers were not completed.

When the American returned to the INTOURIST Office, she was directed to another building in the area. She subsequently learned that the local Soviet KGB had an office in this building. In the building, she was directed to a room where she met two males dressed in civilian clothes who did not identify themselves to her. They questioned her in detail about her background, the cost of her United States passport, the number of Russian people living in the area of her residence in the United States, and the reasons for her departure from the Soviet Union in the 1940's. The American told the interrogators that it appeared to her that she was being treated as a Russian citizen. They acknowledged that they looked upon her as a Russian citizen, because she was born in Russia and her father was Russian. She told them that she was a United States citizen and resented their line of questioning. The two men encouraged her to remain in the Soviet Union, because she had brothers and a sister residing there. She was also encouraged by them to appear on a Russian television station. She refused, became upset, started to cry, and told her interrogators she desired to leave the Soviet Union right away. They attempted to pacify her and told her not to reveal her interview with them to anyone.

Upon leaving, she proceeded to the home of her brother and made known that she planned to leave the Soviet Union immediately. She subsequently visited the INTOURIST Office and told them that, although she had a six-month visa to stay in the Soviet Union, she planned to leave the country as soon as arrangements could be made for her departure. She was told by the INTOURIST representative to return to the office in two or three days to ask for permission to leave the Soviet Union. When she returned to the INTOURIST Office, she was told that her papers were not in order and to return in a few more days. This process went on for about two

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weeks and finally was given permission to leave the country. Her experiences in the Soviet Union disturbed her to the point that she was forced to seek medical assistance for a nervous condition following her return to the United States.

OBSERVATIONS

Over the years members of the intelligence community have collected a wealth of material on harassment and provocations which transpired in Eastern European countries. Our collective experiences suggest no particularly dramatic changes in pattern. There has been a noticeable increase in the use of technical devices but this may be viewed as a difference in degree rather than kind.

In view of the increased number of tourists to East European countries, there may be a tendency to conclude that harassment and provocations have by and large ceased. This is not the case. There has been no indication of a curtailment or cessation of these activities. ~~At best we might conclude that the East European~~ intelligence services have exercised selectivity of targets to a greater degree than has been the case in the past.

It is interesting to note that in spite of the heavy US interest in the entire drug scene, reaching international scale and even projecting a US position of "hands off" local country actions in cases of legal action against US nationals found involved in the drug scene, that East European countries have not capitalized on this issue. No department or agency submitted any material that addresses the employment of narcotics in relation to harassment and provocation.

Some other observations which may be made from a review of available material on the KGB follow. But to a varying degree the same points might apply to Eastern Europe.

1. The KGB's principal concern is connection with tourists is to prevent espionage. The KGB will arrest any foreign tourist caught at espionage (either observational espionage or agent operations). The KGB may try to recruit the offender, but if he refuses he can be expected to be tried and sentenced.

2. The Soviets regularly expel foreign visitors who offend Soviet laws or "Soviet reality," e.g., causing serious traffic accidents or spreading "slanderous" propaganda. Again the KGB may occasionally try to recruit such offenders.

3. The KGB is particularly suspicious of tourists who speak fluent Russian, who make repeated visits to the USSR or who try to break away from their tour group. Tourists who have ethnic ties to the USSR or who have relatives living there may be considered good recruitment targets.

4. Soviet vigilantes (druz hiniki) occasionally make unwarranted citizen's arrests. In such cases, the police, probably with KGB knowledge and approval, have released the foreigner once the misunderstanding has been cleared up.

5. The KGB will place special coverage on people of interest. This includes scientific visitors, businessmen of suspicion for one reason or another, and all suspected or known intelligence personnel or officials of the US Government believed to have access to classified material because of their role in the government. The special coverage probably will include surveillance and technical audio means. But primarily the coverage will consist of agents. The KGB uses agents to cover the target's movements, to assess him, to try to provoke him into a compromising situation or to induce him to engage in espionage.

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CONCLUSIONS

The experience of the intelligence community in defending itself against the activities of East European intelligence services demonstrates that certain practices are effective. Primary among these are the careful selection of personnel assigned to serve in East European countries and the provision of a sound defensive briefing to those on a short-term visit.

The selection of personnel is beyond the scope of this study. It is left to the sponsoring departments and agencies to exercise and apply the highest possible criteria.

The defensive briefings should be given to both those selected for long-term assignments and visits of short duration made by government-affiliated or related personnel.

The briefing should include details of tactics and procedures used in harassment and provocation.

Individuals should be informed that it is in their interest to report immediately any suspected attempt of provocation, harassment, or entrapment. They should be encouraged to report recruitment attempts if harassment or provocations succeed in bringing about such a situation.

Assurances should be given that the report will not be made public if conditions permit. Personal embarrassment or implicit self-denigrating circumstances must not interfere with reporting or be considered dominant features and justification not to report. The individuals should be given to understand that US authorities recognize the problems encountered in residence or visits to East European countries. Further, assurances of all possible assistance should be given.

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Lastly, a word to the departments and agencies. Defensive Briefings are important to the continued protection of US personnel. But there must be follow-up action to debrief the traveler. There may have been KGB-directed incidents or events that were not evident to the traveler. Only continued collection of experiences will enable the US Government to prepare truly relevant and timely advice and guidance in the defensive briefings. It is suggested, therefore, that departments and agencies responsible for conducting defensive briefings initiate a program of debriefings of the travelers. Such debriefings can help perfect the efforts being expended in frustrating or negating harassments and provocations orchestrated by East European intelligence services.

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